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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J . P . KOCH, INC., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. > Case No. 
13850 
J . C. P E N N E Y COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E K I N D O F CASE 
This is a suit to recover money allegedly owing 
for labor and material furnished for the improvement 
of property owned by the appellant pursuant to a con-
struction contract, said action being based upon the 
provisions of Section 14-2-1 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) 
et.seq. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
The appellant's statement as to the disposition of 
the lower court is essentially correct. 
1 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks to have the Judgment en-
tered by the lower court against the appellant, J . C. 
Penney Company, sustained. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts 
contained in the appellant's Brief in part. However, the 
Statement of Facts should include additional inform-
ation. I t is true that on or about September 18, 1970, 
the bond required by the contract between the appellant 
and Skyline Construction Company, the general con-
tractor, was deleted from said general contract. This 
deletion took place after the appellant requested of 
Skyline Construction the amount of deduction that 
would be made if the bond were deleted. I t was deter-
mined that a deduction of approximately $11,000.00 in 
the cost of the project could be made if the bond were 
deleted and as a result the appellant deleted the bond 
requirement. (Peterson deposition pages 3 and 4, lines 
7 through 7). The respondent was not notified of the 
deletion of the bond requirement. 
I t is true that during the period of construction, 
progress payments were made by the appellant to the 
general contractor from time to time as work progressed. 
The payment requests submitted by Skyline to the ap-
pellant were accompanied usually by some type of lien 
waiver from the various subcontractors and materials 
2 
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men on the job. The lien waivers with which the Court 
is here concerned are designated as pages 95 through 
104 inclusive, of the Record on Appeal. There is no 
dollar figure nor date appearing on the first waiver. (R. 
95). The same is true with the second waiver. (R. 96). 
Page 97 of the Record reflects the first lien waiver 
wherein a particular dollar figure is indicated. Again, 
however, this waiver bears no date. I t does however, 
speak in terms of labor and materials furnished on or 
before April 30, 1971. The next lien waiver is dated 
May 31, 1971. (R. 98). The figures contained in said 
lien waiver do not in any way correspond or conform 
with the figure indicated on the prior lien waiver. The 
next lien waiver is also dated May 31, 1971. (R. 99). 
I t reflects a different amount received as of May 31, 
1971 than does the previous one. The next lien waiver 
is dated June 30, 1971. (R. 100). The only blank filled 
in on that lien waiver is a figure for the total amount 
received to the date of June 30, 1974. The next lien 
waiver is dated August 8, 1971. (R. 101). The figures 
contained in such lien waiver are inconsistent with the 
figures in the prior lien waivers. The discrepancy be-
tween these two waivers is the sum of $54,793.20. The 
next lien waiver is dated August 27, 1971. (R. 102). 
The figures contained in this lien waiver are incon-
sistent with all those prior thereto. This lien waiver in 
fact reflects a decrease in the figure representing the 
total amount received from the prior lien waiver. The 
next lien waiver bears Peterson's stamp date of Oc-
tober 13, 1971. (R. 103). Otherwise it is undated. The 
3 
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figures contained in said lien waiver are inconsistent 
with any of the lien waivers prior thereto. The final 
lien waiver bears the date of October 31,1971. (R. 104). 
Again, the figures contained therein are inconsistent 
with the figures contained in all of the prior lien waivers. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E D I S T R I C T COURT W A S CORRECT 
IN I T S F I N D I N G T H A T U N D E R T H E CIR-
CUMSTANCES O F T H I S CASE T H E A P P E L -
L A N T I S L I A B L E TO T H E R E S P O N D E N T 
BY V I R T U E O F T H E P R O V I S I O N S O F SEC-
T I O N 14-2^1 U.C.A. (1953 AS A M E N D E D ) ET. 
SEQ. 
The appellant asserts that it is indebted to the re-
spondent in the sum of only $11,317.02. The appellant 
bases this assertion upon the lien waiver dated October 
31, 1971. (R. 104). The appellant asserts that it paid 
the sum of $579,608.34 to Skyline Construction Com-
pany as payment for work performed by the respondent. 
The prime contractor, Skyline Construction Company 
failed to pay a total sum of $58,308.61 exclusive of in-
terest to the respondent. 
Under the circumstances of this case, it is clear 
that the appellant is liable to the respondent in the sum 
4 
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of $56,147.97 as a matter of law. Section 14-2-1 U.C.A. 
(1953 as amended) provides as follows: 
"The owner of any interest in land entering into 
a contract, involving $500.00 or more, for the 
construction of any building structure or im-
provement upon land shall, before any such work 
is commenced, obtain from the contractor a bond 
in the sum equal to the contract price with good 
and sufficient sureties conditioned for the faith-
ful performance of the contract and prompt pay-
ment for material furnished and labor performed 
under the contract. Such bond shall run to the 
owner and to all other persons as their interest 
may appear; any person who furnished materials 
or performed labor for or upon any such build-
ing, structure, or improvement, payment for 
which has not been made, shall have a direct right 
of action against the sureties upon such bond for 
the reasosable value of the materials furnished or 
the labor performed, not exceeding, however, in 
any case, the prices agreed upon; which right of 
action shall accrue forty days after the comple-
tion, or abandonment, or default in the perform-
ance of the work provided for in the contract." 
Section 14-2-2 U.C.A., (1953) provides as follows: 
"Any person subject to the provisions of this 
chapter who shall fail to obtain such good and 
sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein 
required, shall be personally liable to all persons 
who have furnished materials or performed labor 
under the contract for the reasonable value of 
such materials furnished or labor performed, not 
exceeding, however, in any case, the prices agreed 
upon. Actions to recover on such liability shall 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be commenced within one year from the last date 
the last materials were furnished or the labor per* 
formed . . . " (emphasis added) 
As is admitted by the appellant, and is clear from 
the facts set forth, the appellant failed to require a bond 
with a good and sufficient surety to guarantee the 
prompt payment for the material furnished and the 
labor performed under the contract with Skyline Con-
struction Company. At the time that the respondent 
submitted its bid to Skyline Construction Company on 
the appellant's project, said appellant required that 
such project be a bonded job. Thereafter, the appel-
lant deleted the requirements for bonding on the part 
of Skyline Construction Company without notice to 
the respondent due to the savings in costs on the project 
of approximately $11,000.00. 
This Court has had occasion to construe the mean-
ing of the above quoted statutory language and has 
held that the owner of the property is liable to the sub-
contractors and employees of contractors for materials 
and labor supplied for improvement upon such land 
even where releases and lien waivers for the entire 
amount due and owing such person had been signed and 
delivered to the owner. In fact, however, such persons 
had not received the entire amount due and owing under 
the contract and employment agreements. This Court 
has consistently held that such releases and waivers were 
given without consideration and thus ineffective. 
In the case of Pierce v. Pepper, 17 Utah 2d *SG^ 
6 
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405 P.2d 345 (1965), plaintiff's employees were paid 
by their employer, Pepper, with worthless checks. They 
went to the defendant owner-builder who paid them for 
part of their work on condition that they sign releases 
and give lien waivers which would cover the entire 
amount of work which they had performed. The plain-
tiffs proceeded to complete the job, but were still un-
paid for their prior labor because of the worthless checks. 
Recovery against the owner-builder was granted because 
of his failure to require the contractor to post the statu-
tory contractor's bond as required under Section 14-2-1, 
U.C.A. (1953 as amended). The court held: 
"Failure to require the contractor to file the 
statutory bond is absolute and not subject to 
compromise here since the obligation was not 
dubious, contradictory or otherwise and any at-
tempt to circumvent the statutory interdiction 
was without consideration . . . Having violated 
it . . . there was no consideration for the waivers, 
and the failure to require the contractor to file a 
bond to protect these workers under the plain 
wording of the statute, cannot ameliorate the ob-
ligations of the builder from its terms. . . . " (em-
phasis added) 
This Court again had occasion to construe the 
meaning of this statute in the case of Roberts Invest-
ment Company v. Gibbons and Reed Concrete Products 
Company, 22 Utah 2d 105, 449 P.2d 116 (1969). In 
that case the owner of the property, while proceeding 
with the building project, employed various contractors 
to accomplish different phases of the construction. In 
7 
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attempting to fulfill its contract with the owner, one of 
the contractors obtained concrete from Gibbons and 
Reed Concrete Products Company. Subsequently, the 
owner took over the construction project from that con-
tractor and proceeded to complete the building. The 
owner thereafter acquired additional concrete from Gib* 
bons and Reed Concrete Products Company. The own-
er subsequently paid Gibbons and Reed concrete Prod-
ucts Company for the amount of concrete which it had 
ordered after taking over the construction project from 
the contractor. Along with this payment, the owner de-
manded a receipt which recited that the sum mentioned 
was in full payment for labor and material furnished 
by Gibbons and Reed for the building in question, and 
further recited that disputes over amounts due for ma-
terials delivered to the owner were waived and settled 
and Gibbons and Reed released the owner from any and 
all claims it may have against the owner. The trial court 
concluded that the release and receipt was a release of 
all claims of Gibbons and Reed and entered judgment 
of no cause of action. The Supreme Court reversed and 
held that (1) the owner's payment of that amount to 
Gibbons and Reed was not sufficient consideration for 
the supplier's release of their claim against the contract-
or, and, (2) under Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. 
(1953), the owner who had failed to obtain a perform-
ance bond from the contractor was liable for the amount 
owing the suppliers for concrete supplied by them to 
the Contractor. There was no dispute in the case that 
the owner had failed to comply with the requirements of 
8 
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Section 14-2-1, U.C.A. (1953). However, the owner 
contended that having made the payment and having 
received the release of all claims from Gibbons and 
Reed, it was relieved from any liability arising under the 
statute. The Court, citing Pierce v. Pepper, supra, re-
jected defendant's argument and held that there was no 
consideration for the release of the claim against the 
contractor and by virtue of non-compliance with the 
statute, the owner was personally liable for such claims. 
The Court is confronted with the same type of situation 
here. The respondent did not receive the money due 
under the terms of the contract. The waivers given, in 
addition to being inconsistent, were not supported by 
any consideration whatsoever. 
The appellant has gone to great lengths in its 
Brief attempting to review the law regarding mechanics' 
liens. The requirements with which the Court is here 
concerned are set forth in Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 
U.C.A. (1953 as amended). The appellant would have 
this Court ignore these statutes and merely review the 
mechanics' liens statutes of the state. We are not here 
concerned with the respondent's right to a mechanics' 
lien on the appellant's property, although even under 
such law, the respondent asserts that it would have had 
a valid claim. 
I t is to be noted that the statute in question does 
not make any qualification whatsoever as to the personal 
]lability of one who fails to comply with the require-
ments of that statute. Quite the contrary, the statutory 
9 
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duty to file the bond is mandatory and any attempt to 
circumvent the statutory interdiction is without con-
sideration. Pierce v. Pepper, supra. The appellant has 
attempted to engraft upon the statute limitations of 
liability without any legal authority in support of its 
position. The appellant cites various mechanics' lien 
cases which are inapplicable when applied to the fact 
situation with which the Court is here confronted. The 
appellant cites Zions First National Bank v. Reginald 
L Sawton, et al, 27 Utah 2d 76, 493 P.2d 602 (1972) 
in support of its position. The factual situation in Sax-
ton clearly demonstrates its inapplicability herein. In 
Saxton. the appellant had in fact been paid in excess 
of the amount of his claim. The fact that he signed a 
lien waiver at the time that he received payment dem-
onstrates that full and adequate consideration was given 
is in exchange for receipt of the lien waiver. The actions 
of the appellant in Sacvton subsequent to his receipt 
of the funds were irrelevant to the consideration be-
fore the Court. I t should further be noted that the case 
made no reference whatsoever to Section 14-2-1 and 
14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953), and dealt solely with the me-
chanics' lien statutes. 
The same distinctions as above set forth hold true 
with regard to the case of Holbrook v. Websters, Inc., 
7 Utah 2d 148,H#P.2d 661 (1958). The Court specif-
ically found that the appellant had executed the receipt 
and lien waivers in exchange for good and valuable con-
sideration. I t is again important to note that Holbrook 
did not concern itself whatsoever with Section 14-2-1 
10 
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and 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953). Holbrook, as was the case 
in Saxton, concerned itself strictly with the operation of 
the mechanics' lien statutes. 
The case of West v. Pinkston, 44 Utah 123, 138 P . 
1152, in addition to being distinguishable on the same 
basis as the above cases, was decided in 1914. The spe-
cific language of the Utah Supreme Court in West, as 
quoted by the appellant in its Brief, clearly states that 
the decision of the Court was based upon the statutes 
concerning mechanics' liens as they existed at that time. 
However, the appellant fails to point out that the "sta-
tute" to which the Court referred was not the statute 
with which the Court is confronted in the case at bar, 
and indeed such burden would be impossible due to the 
fact that the statute now in question was not enacted by 
the Utah Legislature until 1915. 
The appellant further cites the two cases of King 
Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13 Utah 
2d 339, 374 P.2d 254 (1962) and Crane Company v. 
Utah Motor Park, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 413, 335 P.2d 837. 
In each of these cases, the Utah Supreme Court looked 
at cases decided under the mechanics' lien statutes in 
order to determine what was lienable. After consider-
ing whether a leasehold interest constituted an owner-
ship interest which could be lienable in the former and 
whether a boiler was purchased for resale or whether a 
contract had been entered into for alteration and repair 
of the defendants property in the latter, the Court, speci-
fically held in Crane, that, 
11 
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"The owner may escape personal liability by ob-
taining the bond as required by the statute." 
There are no qualifications of liability imposed by these 
cases. 
The appellant asserts in its Brief that liability 
under Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953) is not 
absolute. In support of this proposition the appellant 
cites the case of Apex Lumber Company v. Comanche 
Construction Company, 18 Utah 2d 119, 417 P.2d 131 
(1966). In that case some Utah farmers employed 
Comanche Construction Company to install turkey en-
closures upon their land. In the process, Comanche ob-
tained materials from Apex Lumber Company. Upon 
completion of the job, Apex Lumber Company accepted 
promissory notes from the contractor as payment for 
the materials supplied. Comanche Construction sub-
sequently resorted to bankruptcy, making the promise 
sory notes worthless. Secondly, the evidence demon-
strated that Apex allocated in a somewhat arbitrary 
manner the amounts due from each specific farmer. The 
jury found that Apex had been paid by virtue of its 
acceptance of the promissory notes. 
The language quoted by the appellant in its Brief 
requires analysis. The Court stated that, 
"Apex urges that (1) the evidence shows Apex 
supplied material for which it was not wholly 
paid. Apex is right, but this is not controlling, 
since such an argument would insure it against 
12 
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any non-payment which it itself helped to pro-
duce, as was the case here. Further it says, (2) 
that under the statute it has a cause of action for 
the unpaid value of the material. Equally, this 
is true, unless it was particeps in creating a de-
fense for its opponents, as was the case here. 
Each of these positions is consistent with the hold-
ing in the case and the finding by the jury that Apex 
simply was estopped by virtue of the fact that it had 
been paid for the materials supplied in the construction 
of the turkey enclosures. Apex demanded and received 
the promissory notes in full payment for the balance 
due Comanche. Apex, of course, had the option to 
require cash payment and the fact that it accepted pay-
ment through another medium was its own choice. I t 
was thereby estopped by virtue of payment in fact. 
Assuming arguendo, that Apex does represent a 
qualification of the terms of liability imposed by Sec-
tions 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953), one must note 
the policy upon which that qualification rests. In foot-
note Number 1 at page 131, the Court states: 
"This statute can stand a re-evaluation, since it 
puts the onus of obtaining the contractor's bond 
on the unsuspecting and unknowledgeable house-
holder who seldom knows of its existence—in 
favor of the prime supplier, who generally knows 
all about it but relies on it in sober silence, (em-
phasis added)" 
When one considers this statement by the Court in 
light of the facts presented in the case at bar, it is irp-
13 
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mediately apparent that such policy is not involved in 
this case. J . C. Penney Co. is a highly sophisticated 
international corporation that has built hundreds of 
stores across the United States. The appellant is not 
in the position of the "unsuspecting and unknowledge-
able householder" who seldom knows of the existence of 
the statute. In fact, the appellant knew of the existence 
of the statute and initially required that a bond be posted 
by the contractor as security for payment of the ma-
terialmen and suppliers on this job. However, upon 
learning that deletion of this requirement would save 
the appellant approximately $11,000.00 in the cost of 
the project, a change was instituted whereby this re-
quirement was deleted. Thus, one need only turn to the 
second Kings Brothers case, 21 Utah 2d 43, 440 P.2d 
17 (1968), wherein the Court specifically required that 
if the owner fails to comply with Section 14-2-1 and 
14-2-2, U.C.A. (1953), "it places upon him the burden 
of seeing that the labor and materials are paid for." 
The facts in the case at bar demonstrate that the ap-
pellant did not carry its burden as required by the laws 
of the State of Utah and that there was no consideration 
given in exchange for the lien waivers supplied by the 
respondent. The respondent was not paid. (See Pierce 
V. Pepper, supra, and Roberts Investment Company v. 
Gibbons and Reed Concrete Products, supra.) 
The appellant in its Brief asserts that the laws 
of the mechanics' lien statutes, as construed by the 
various cases handed down by the Utah Supreme Court, 
should govern the extent of applicability of Section 14-
14 
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2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953). The respondent can-
not accept this assertion as being the law of the State 
of Utah. If the mechanics' lien statute is the law which 
governs the situation with which the Court is now con-
fronted, then why did the Legislature see fit to enact 
Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953)? The Utah 
Supreme Court has spoken to this point in the past. 
In King Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13 
Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d 254, (1962), the Court said that 
the mechanics' lien statute was designed to prevent the 
land holder from taking the benefit of improvements 
without paying for labor and materials incident there-
to. However, the Court noted that the land owner fre-
quently was the loser when the contractor failed to pay 
for the material and labor supplied. The Court noted 
that the passage of Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. 
(1953) was a natural consequence of this inequity and 
protected the laborer, the materialmen, and the land 
owner. 
The King Brothers case above cited is relied upon 
by the appellant. However, appellant failed to illum-
inate the sequel to the above case which was King 
Brothers Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 21 Utah 2d 
43, 440 P.2d 17 (1968) wherein the Court dealt with 
the question of whether the owner of a leasehold inter-
est in land was "the owner of any interest in land" under 
Section 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, U.C.A. (1953), The Court 
utilized adjudications under the mechanics' liens statutes 
only for the determination of the definition of an "own-
er" so as to apply the above referenced statute. Again, 
15 
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the Court was impelled to note that: 
"the statutes quoted above (Section 14-2-1 and 
14-2-2, U.C.A. (1953) which required the owner 
to obtain a bond from a contractor, are a natural 
development upon the mechanics' lien statutes, 
which compel the owner of realty, who contracts 
for its improvement, to see that those who furnish 
the labor and materials are paid. The require-
ment of the performance bond provides a means 
by which the owner can protect himself as well as 
the labor and materialmen. But if he fails to 
comply with the statute, it places upon him the 
burden of seeing that the labor and materials 
are paid for . . ." (emphasis added). 
I t is therefore clear that the statute in question is 
not limited and totally governed by the mechanics' lien 
statute and the a judications thereunder. This Court 
has acknowledged the specific requirements of Sections 
14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953) in placing an extra 
burden upon a land owner so as to insure the payment 
of all materialmen and suppliers for the improvement 
made upon the owner's property. Thus, by failing to 
observe the requirements of the laws of this State, the 
appellant had the burden of seeing that the respondent 
was in fact paid. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E COURT B E L O W W A S CORRECT I N 
H O L D I N G T H A T T H E A P P E L L A N T COULD 
NOT J U S T I F I A B L Y R E L Y ON T H E L I E N 
W A I V E R S I N Q U E S T I O N . 
16 
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The District Court held that the appellant could 
not justifiably rely on the lien waivers in question. 
Contrary to the position taken in the appellant's Brief, 
the Court below referred to such unjustified reli-
ance in holding that "said reliance is not a defense to 
the claim of the plaintiff." (R. 28). The fallacy of 
the appellant's argument of justifiable reliance is dem-
onstrated simply by reference to the facts of this case, 
and specifically with reference to the admissions of the 
appellant's agent, the supervising architect. 
In the process of the construction of the appellant's 
store in Bountiful, Skyline Construction Company per-
iodically submitted requests for progress payments. 
These requests were submitted on a monthly basis and 
were accompanied by various lien waivers signed by the 
subcontractor and materialmen working on the project 
(Page 7 through 8, Peterson's deposition.) These items 
were submitted to Charles Peterson, the supervising 
architect employed by the appellant, who would, upon 
receipt, inspect the job site to determine whether the 
amount submitted on the draw request and supported by 
lien waivers was correct in terms of progress on the pro-
ject. According to Mr. Peterson, 
"We would take these lien waivers and review 
them and see that the amount shown on the lien 
waivers were consistent with the amount of money 
that had been paid on the previous estimate." 
(Peterson's deposition pages 7 and 8 lines 25 
through 2). 
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On various occasions, Mr. Peterson would require 
changes to be made before he would authorize payment. 
He would therefore, request lien waivers reflecting a 
different amount than the one submitted. Mr. Peterson 
accepted changed lien waivers which would sometimes 
reflect only the difference between what was furnished 
by the first one and the amount of change that he had 
requested, and at the same time accepted a subsequent 
lien waiver covering the full amount. (Peterson deposi-
tion, page 10 through 11, lines 13 through 17). With 
this system of accounting, inconsistency had to result. 
In fact, Mr. Peterson knew that there were inconsist-
encies with regard to the lien waivers on behalf of the 
respondent. He brought these inconsistencies to the 
attention of the appellant. The appellant took no action. 
More importantly, however, Mr. Peterson states that, 
" I suspected the maximum lien waiver that I 
had, whether it was the previous month or the 
succeeding month, was equal to or exceeded per-
haps the amount of work that was accomplished. 
I frankly did not worry too much if the lien 
waiver exceeded the amount of money that was 
shown on Skyline's monthly breakdown." 
Mr. Peterson was basically satisfied because he thought 
that the owner was being protected. (Peterson deposi-
tion page 14 lines 4 through 24.) Mr. Peterson further 
acknowledges that he did not expect to get exact figures 
with regard to lien waivers and basically was concerned 
only with some supportive evidence that the subcon^ 
tractors were getting paid as the job progressed. (Peter-
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son deposition page 23 lines 7 through 11). Further, 
when asked if, in his position, it was his primary con-
cern to see that lien wavers were executed for a sum 
equal to or more than the amount needed, he responded. 
"equal to or more, because I assumed that if it 
is more than shown on the trade categories, may-
he the general contractor, you know, paid a guy 
for work a little early." (Peterson deposition 
page 23 lines 17 through 19). (emphasis added). 
Clearly, Peterson, as the agent for the appellant, 
was not complying with the requirements laid down by 
the second Kings Brothers case, 440 P.2d 17, wherein 
the Court states: 
"but if he fails to comply with the statute, it 
places upon him the burden of seeing that the 
labor and materials are paid for." 
Peterson further admits that he was not relying 
upon the lien waivers to show that actual payment had 
been made but only that the subcontractors had waived 
their lien. (Peterson deposition page 25 lines 19 through 
22). Peterson also did not take it upon himself to advise 
the subcontractors that various reductions were being 
made in the lien waivers after they were submitted and 
had no knowledge as to whether Skyline Construction 
had assumed such responsibility. ..(Peterson deposition 
page 29 lines 13-17.) Finally, Mr. Peterson admits, 
that on or about July 14, due to the discrepencies con-
tained in some of the lien waivers, it suggested to him 
that possibly Skyline was not paying to some of the sub-
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contractors as much as was being represented. (Peter-
son deposition page 31 lines 7 through 15). Regardless 
of this suspicion and, indeed, regardless of the require-
ments of Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953 as 
amended), Peterson, as the agent for the appellant, 
failed to satisfy the appellant's burden of seeing that 
the subcontractors were paid. He assumed that may-
be they were being paid. 
With the procedure utilized by Mr. Peterson on 
behalf of the appellant in handling the project, and in 
referring to the lien waivers themselves, it is clear that 
there is no basis for appellant's claim of justifiable re-
liance even if one were to ignore the fact that many of 
the lien waivers were not dated when signed by Mr. 
Niederhauser. One can see the obvious discrepency be-
tween the respondent's lien waivers dated May 31, 1971, 
and June 30, 1971. Two out of the three blanks in-
dicating payment were not filled in on the latter and 
there is no acknowledgment on the part of Mr. Nied-
erhauser of payment on that day in any amount. The 
previous acknowledgment of payment on May 31, 1971, 
acknowledged the receipt of an exact figure on that 
date. The discrepancies however, do not end on June 
31, 1971. The lien waivers dated August 8, 1971, Aug-
ust 27, 1971, and the lien waiver received by Mr. Peter-
son on October 13, 1971, but which was undated as to 
the signature, and the lien waiver dated October 31, 
1971, contain discrepancies in the figures represented 
thereon which are impossible of explanation. When re-
viewing all of the waivers, it is clear that inconsistency 
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permeated the entire system of lien waivers utilized by 
the appellant. The respondent respectfully submits that 
there was no basis on the part of the appellant for any 
reliance when the lien waivers themselves, on their face, 
were inconsistent with each other. Peterson, however, 
when he received the final lien waiver dated October 31, 
1971, upon which appellant asserts reliance, did not even 
bother to compare it with the previous waivers. (Peter-
son's deposition p. 44, lines 4-10). The defendant had 
no factual basis upon which to assert its so-called "justi-
fiable reliance" and the respondent submits that such 
assertion is without any merit whatsoever. Where there 
were uncertainties in the instruments, such as is clearly 
apparent here, it was incumbent upon the appellant to 
resolve these uncertainties before acting in reliance on 
these uncertain representations. (See the second King 
Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., supra.) The ap-
pellant's assertion now that respondent is estopped by 
virtue of these uncertain documents and representations, 
is without merit and is not a basis upon which the ap-
pellant could assert justifiable reliance. (See Petty v. 
Gindy Manufacturing Corporation, 404 P.2d 30, 17 
Utah 2d 32 (1965)). 
The appellant further asserts that its defense of 
reliance is available to a surety if a bond had been re-
quired. No Utah law is cited in support of this propo-
sition. But, assuming that a defense of justifiable reli-
ance would be available to a surety, one need only return 
to the facts as above set forth to determine that there is 
no basis for such a defense here. The appellant was ad-
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vised of the discrepancies in the lien waivers and chose 
to ignore it. But the appellant asserts that it took all 
possible precautions to assure itself that all subcon-
tractors were being paid by the general contractor 
through progress payments during the course of the 
construction project. Clearly, the appellant's position 
is untenable and totally unsupported. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E O R D E R C O N D I T I O N A L L Y STAY-
I N G E N F O R C E M E N T O F T H E J U D G M E N T 
IS VALID. 
The Order Conditionally Staying Enforcement of 
Judgment herein was just that: the execution upon the 
Judgment was stayed upon the Stipulation of appel-
lant to satisfy a condition. That condition is clearly 
spelled out in the Order (R. 11). 
Under Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, the District Court has discretion whether to 
stay execution upon a Judgment under certain circum-
stances. Clearly, the respondent was entitled to exe-
cute immediately upon entry of the Judgment. Rule 
62(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The appellant moved the Court for an Order Stay-
ing Enforcement of the Judgment against it, counsel 
was heard on the motion and the Court entered its Order 
whereby the appellant was given a choice in the matter 
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and elected to perform pursuant to the condition con-
tained in said Order. The appellant cannot now be 
heard to complain regarding the exercise of its choice 
in the matter. Appellant clearly had the alternative to 
pay the Judgment assessed and pursue its appeal, or 
retain the money represented by the Judgment and 
agree to pay the interest rate ordered by the Court be-
low. I t chose the latter. The Order is clear regarding 
this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the facts of this case that the ap-
pellant has attempted to circumvent the statutory inter-
diction of Section 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953 as 
amended). This Court has consistently held that such 
attempts are unjustified and the failure of the owner to 
require the bond under the plain wording of the statute 
cannot ameliorate the obligations of the owner from its 
terms. As this Court said in Pierce v. Pepper, supra, 
"This Court did not pass the statute, but we 
think it clear enough to impose liability if the 
builder (owner) forgets it or tries to save a bond 
premium by violating it." 
The law of this state imposes a burden upon the 
owner to see that the subcontractors and materialmen 
are paid. When the owner disregards the requirement 
of Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953, as amend-
ed) that burden is absolute. I t requires that the owner 
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determine for himself that these people who have con-
tributed their efforts and materials for the benefit of 
the owner are in fact paid for same. Here, the appellant, 
by the admissions of its agent and supervising architect, 
did not satisfy this duty. 
The Judgment below in favor of the repondent and 
against the appellant should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R I C H A R D H . M O F F A T 
J O H N L. Y O U N G 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
9th Floor Tribune Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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